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 Three cases have sparked my interest to investigate the 
roles of examples in education. They are the cases of Mother 
Teresa, the senior vice president of people operations at Google, 
and Diogenes the Cynic. All three share in potentially revealing 
moral or intellectual virtues like courage, open-mindedness, 
authenticity, and caring for truth. While virtues might be best 
taught by examples, behind this lingers the question of what can be 
learned from a methodological use of examples. This leads me to 
introduce the research method of examples, show its application in 
virtue epistemology, and use it to study Diogenes the Cynic. 
Finally, I conclude that examples, while essential to education, are 
rarely innocent. 
 
Examples as Methodology 
To appreciate the power of examples and explain my 
methodology, I present Davis’s (2010) methodological use of 
examples. While he admits to “work with a broad notion of 
‘example’, where each case includes an assessment context, 
together with the cultural and political circumstances in which it is 
embedded” (p. 55), the ways in which Davis uses examples are 
complex and varied. From specific examples, to out-of-research-
area examples—including fictitious examples—, counter-intuitive 
examples, and opposing examples, Davis applies them to shed 
light, destabilize, and argue for a conclusion. 
In thinking of Davis’s uses of examples we must ask if all 
examples are equal. Is searching for an example of a virtuous 
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student like searching for an example of a triangle? No. 
Comparable exactitude cannot be expected; identification of the 
examples is a challenge; the argumentative roles of examples vary; 
and, the heuristic functions of examples differ. 
Kotzee (2016) captures all of this in searching for the good 
student when he remarks that:  
intellectual virtues are learned by emulating intellectual role 
models and by practicing to be intellectually virtuous. […] 
From the perspective of the teacher, giving instruction and 
modelling behaviour need to be accompanied by ways for 
the teacher to see whether the instructions and examples 
are having an effect. (p. 147) 
But which examples? Which virtues? Who counts as a good 
example? Who counts as a really good example, like an exemplar? 
To what can a teacher refer? To approach these questions, let us 
turn to the origins of intellectual virtues theory. 
 
Examples of Intellectually Virtuous Students 
 Over 2,000 years ago Aristotle established his notion of 
intellectual virtues. The morally and intellectually virtuous person 
is such that he is in “a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean 
relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in 
which the man of practical wisdom would determine it” (Aristotle, 
trans. 1984, 1106b35-1107a2). As we can see, a lot depends on the 
person of practical wisdom. But where did she obtain that 
knowledge? Who was the first wise person? Are there any other 
wise persons? What if none are present? Was it admiration that 
led to someone pointing out “Now there goes a wise person!”? 
Admired for what? On what basis? In giving examples more 
happens than just illustrating intellectual virtues. There is case 
building, intuition developing, convention testing, and idea revising 
in ways that are not just heuristic. This is why the three examples 
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given in the introduction are so significant. They are 
argumentative, as we shall see. 
The first example comes from the public’s reaction during 
Linda Zagzebski’s 2013 presentation of exemplarism during the 
Educating for Intellectual Virtues conference at Loyola 
Marymount University. When asked who would be a good 
example, an exemplar of a virtuous person, she responded that 
Mother Teresa might count. Negative reactions were swift. 
Counter examples, like Hitler and Stalin, were said to be also 
widely admired in their context (and for some, still today). Others 
asked about the hateful people Mother Teresa helped (see also 
Schultz, 2016). So are examples or exemplars heroes for some, 
villains for others? What if no agreement is possible? Are 
examples dangerous? 
The second example concerns Baehr’s (2015) appeal to a 
“senior vice president of people operations” at Google (p. 40). 
What struck me was the casualness with which Google is 
presented as a good example in the sense that: 
if we want to prepare our students for success in the 
workplace [like Google], it isn’t enough that we 
simply impart to them a certain body of knowledge 
or set of technical skills. We must also address and 
attempt to shape who they are as thinkers and 
learners. (Baehr, 2015, p. 41) 
It is true that Google’s mantra was “Don’t Be Evil” (Basu, 2015, 
para. 1). But Google has also questionably digitized millions of 
books, monetizes its users’ information, and strains privacy rights. 
Does this count as “success in the workplace” (Baehr, 2015, p. 
41)? Is it a good example? 
 
The third example comes from a question asked during 
my PhD research project proposal defence: Was Diogenes the 
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Cynic a virtuous learner? This uncanny and provocative character, 
as we shall see in the next section, pushes the limits of the meaning 
of the virtuous learner. 
From this we can gather that without a proper 
understanding of the roles of examples, the theory to which they 
refer and build, we bypass fertile grounds for research and limit 
teachable content. To illustrate this, let us examine the case of 
Diogenes the Cynic. 
 
Diogenes the Cynic, a Good Example? 
In Cultivating Good Minds Baehr (2015) presents a three-
dimensional view of the virtuous student based on: ability, 
motivation, and judgement. For example, an intellectually virtuous 
student can be intellectually courageous, is motivated to be so by 
risking an idea, and appropriately judges when to do so. Baehr’s 
(2015) theory states that: 
Virtue concepts like curiosity, intellectual humility, 
intellectual thoroughness, and intellectual tenacity 
are very well suited to provide a more concrete 
description of these important but elusive 
educational goals. Intellectual virtues are character 
traits that flow from a love of learning. An 
intellectually virtuous person, in an ideal form at 
least, is one who cares passionately about reaching 
the truth and acquiring deep knowledge and 
understanding. (p. 28) 
With this outline in hand, let us see if Diogenes was a virtuous 
student. 
Diogenes the Cynic lived from 404-323 BCE. He was born 
in the Milesian colony of Sinope, in Greece. Exiled in his early 
thirties on account of fraud, Diogenes moved to Athens where 
philosophy changed his life. As Hard (2012) reports: 
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He is popularly known for having lived in a barrel 
or tub and for his barbed utterances. But Diogenes 
was more than a picturesque eccentric, and it is only 
when such stories are considered in their wider 
context, as part of the very full surviving record of 
what Diogenes was supposed to have said and done, 
that it becomes apparent that he was trying to 
convey a serious message through his disconcerting 
behaviour and caustic wit [emphasis 
added]. (Introduction) 
Part of Diogenes’ life includes barking like a dog to passers-by, 
eating scraps of food like a beggar, and masturbating in public. 
Surely, he is an unlikely candidate to be a virtuous learner. 
 To understand his motivations we can look at what he was 
fighting against. Rebuking the customs and values of his adopted 
city meant that Diogenes saw something fundamentally wrong 
happening. Questioning the values of seeking wealth and security, 
as well as intellectual pride, he adopted a radical approach. Lucian 
captures Diogenes’s view through this exchange: “BUYER: This 
life that you talk of is revolting and inhuman. DIOGENES: Ah 
yes, but it is a very easy one, my friend, and practicable for all to 
follow. For you will have no need of any education” (as cited in 
Hard, 2012, part 1,1). How can a life be inhuman and easy to 
follow? How can it require no education, as well as mental and 
physical training, as Diogenes states elsewhere (Hard, 2012, 
Introduction)? 
During Diogenes’s journey towards philosophy, we also 
learn from Diogenes Laertius that “Diogenes won his way through 
persistence” (as cited in Hard, part 1,2). However, is this a virtue 
put to good use? It is a question that arises when we see that 
Diogenes asks listeners to: 
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assume an alien mode of speech and snarling voice, 
just like the yapping of a dog, and assume a sullen 
expression, and a manner of walking that is in 
accord with your face; in short, everything about you 
must be bestial and savage. Away with all modesty, 
decency, and moderation, and wipe off any blushes 
from your face once and for all. (as cited in Hard, 
2012, part 1,1) 
Beyond persistence and courage, complete humility and 
authenticity best capture Diogenes’ journey. Accepting shame, 
being called a dog, and begging for food calls for great humility, 
one that is, by many standards, disturbing, as well as humiliating. 
We see that Diogenes does not share others’ values, and 
yet seeks truth. As a biographer notes: 
Such was the way in which he would argue and he 
certainly seems to have acted accordingly, re-
stamping the currency in very truth, by not ascribing 
the same worth to merely conventional values as to 
those that accord with nature; and he thus 
maintained that his way of life was of the same 
stamp as that of Heracles, in so far as he set 
freedom above all else. (as cited in Hard, 2012, part 
1,5) 
This re-stamping, which was hard won, supports the idea that 
“Cynicism is a short cut to virtue” (Diogenes Laertius, as cited in 
Hard, 2012, part 1,5). But is such gruff freedom the only virtue? 
 Diogenes’s life exemplifies joining theory and practice. 
Were it only so, why should he still be of interest? As Hard (2012) 
states “the Cynic way of life was so closely associated with 
Diogenes, anyone who adopted it must have run the risk of 
appearing to be no more than a pale imitation of him” 
(Introduction). Arguably, few would model him today. Diogenes is 
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so violent by example that citizenship education might see him as 
vicious. Even Socrates, as Noddings (2012) explores, might not be 
well received in today’s educational settings: 
If you were to follow Socrates’ example, you would 
certainly have to explore highly sensitive questions 
with your students. Would you be allowed to do so? 
Should the school district or state forbid you to 
discuss certain topics? Or consider the charges 
against Socrates that he did not believe in the states’ 
gods. Do we hear similar charges hurled at various 
public figures today? (p. 7) 
So, what are we to do with Diogenes, a “Socrates gone mad” 
according to Plato (as cited in Hard, 2012, part 1,5)? Keep him as 
a funny, base, vulgar, and caustic historical character to be laughed 
at and wondered about? 
If it is a worry that examples are moving targets, differing 
according to time, geography, culture, and circumstances, 
Diogenes was a moving target as such. But what if virtues are stable 
and unstable? Furthermore, Diogenes’s transition from vice to 
virtue embodies moral progress, and perhaps even the idea of the 
need for a misadventure (like fraud) for one to be put on the road 
to virtue. This made Diogenes a virtuous learner. Finally, should a 
teacher present Diogenes, it can be a provocative strategy to 
illustrate the breadth of ways of being and learning in a society 
where education equals indoctrination or commodification, 
rampant conformity looms, or questionable values are followed. 
 
Conclusion 
At the outset I aimed to show with arguments and 
examples, the methodological significance of understanding the 
consequences of using examples in the context of illustrating a 
theory and teaching virtues. Kotzee, Baehr, and Zagzebski show 
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that examples give something extra when teaching virtues, yet we 
still wonder how examples affect our understanding of virtues as 
such. The casualness with which some examples are presented 
betrays the fact that some are quite contentious. Without a full 
understanding of examples and exemplars we are short-changed of 
the contribution they offer in the quest to understand, model, and 
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